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Five Supreme Court Constitutions: Race-Based Scrutiny
Past, Present, and Future*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the birth of the U.S. Constitution, one of its most persistent
questions has concerned the disparate treatment of races. Like an
organism that gradually accommodates environmental stresses, the
Constitution has evolved in response to its changed surroundings.
In the Constitutional Conventions, the principal question of racebased scrutiny was how to treat African-Americans and Native-Americans
differently from caucasians. 1 Later, constitutional amendments and
Supreme Court decisions changed the question to whether to treat racial
minorities differently. 2 Recently the Supreme Court has moved closer
to disallowing disparate treatment of racial minorities altogether. 3
After the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were ratified, the Court
repeatedly asked two questions: first, whether the federal government,
which is limited only by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
must be held to the same standard as the states, which are limited by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and second,
whether benign discrimination4 is as suspect as malicious discrimination. 5 The changing answers to these two questions have repeatedly
rewritten the practical effect of the Constitution, even though the text
controlling race-based scrutiny remains unmodified. It would thus appear
that as to race-based scrutiny, our nation has had a series of different
constitutions governing racial issues.
This paper explores the development of constitutional race-based
scrutiny, focussing on the Supreme Court's recent role in creating the
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1. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2 (Three-fifths Compromise and untaxed Indians excluded

from census apportioning Congressional representatives).
2. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
3. See Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
4. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). The term
"benign discrimination" refers to race-based classifications designed to benefit racial minorities
or correct past injustices, such as "affirmative action" programs.
5. The term "malicious discrimination" has been defined as race-based classifications
designed to adversely affect racial minorities. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886).
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constitution that exists today. Part II briefly traces the textual changes
that introduced a new constitutional framework to racial discrimination
analysis. Part III reviews various ways the Court has fleshed out the
constitutional text. Part IV dissects the new rule announced in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 6 which holds that strict scrutiny applies
uniformly to all government racial discrimination cases.
Part V
concludes with a look forward to a constitution the Court is preparing to
create under which race-based laws will be struck down as per se illegal.
II.

THE CONSTITUTION AS IT EVOLVED TEXTUALLY

A.

The Unamended Constitution

Nothing in the Constitution's text precludes any state or federal entity
from drafting statutes or policies that treat persons differently based on
their race. 7 In fact, before the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were
added, the Constitution not only permitted racial discrimination, but
endorsed it. The drafters effectively adopted the policy that AfricanAmericans were not equally protected when the drafters agreed to the
Although on its face the Constitution
three-fifths compromise. 8
distinguished only between "free persons" and "others," the real
controversy was over how to apportion Congressional representatives and
taxes based on the number of black slaves. The unamended Constitution
also relegated Indians to an underprivileged class by excluding them for
apportionment purposes if they were untaxed. 9
Both of these racially discriminatory classes might be justified by
arguing that the distinction was based purely on citizenship, since slaves
could be deemed lesser citizens without regard to race, and that untaxed
Indians were arguably citizens of foreign nations. But the facts that the
vast majority of blacks in the United States were slaves, and that the
Constitution explicitly mentioned Indians by race rather than by
citizenship, undermine a "pure citizenship" analysis. The unamended
Constitution not only permitted, but affirmatively sanctioned racial
discrimination.

6. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
7. See Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943) (suggesting that
because the Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal protection clause it does not restrict
federal discriminatory legislation, and implies that only the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
state discrimination).
8. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
9. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
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The Pre-Civil War Fifth Amendment

The passage of the Fifth Amendment imposed a new requirement that
before persons could be deprived of life, liberty, or property, they had
to be afforded due process. 10 But even assuring due process did not
require that laws be drafted to impact each race equally. In Detroit Bank
v. United States, 11 the Court recognized that "the Fifth [Amendment]
contains no equal protection clause and it provides no guaranty against
discriminatory legislation by Congress." 12 Consequently, as originally
interpreted, the Fifth Amendment allowed both the states and the federal
government to enact discriminatory laws. The only protection afforded
a minority citizen subject to such laws was the right to demand due
process in the execution of a discriminatory law.
C.

The Fourteenth Amendment

As far as racial discrimination analysis is concerned, the modern
textual Constitution was born in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited state racial discrimination for the first time:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. 13

Thus, the text prohibited the states from enacting discriminatory laws, but
remained silent about whether the federal government was subject to that
requirement. 14
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. 317 u.s. 329 (1943).
12. /d. at 337. Detroit Bank post-dated passage of the Fourteenth Amendment which did
include an equal protection clause, but the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment was explicitly
directed only at the states and was assumed to have no effect on Congress. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. The term "citizen" was broadly defined in the first
sentence of the Amendment to include "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." ld. Consequently, former black slaves born in the
United States became citizens.
14. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2105 (1995); see also Detroit
Bank, 317 U.S. at 337 ("Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment the Fifth Amendment provides no
guaranty against discriminatory legislation by Congress."); Helvering v. Lerner Stores Corp.,
314 U.S. 463, 468 (1941) ("A claim of unreasonable classification or inequality in the
incidence or application of a tax raises no question under the Fifth Amendment which contains
no equal protection clause."); LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392 (1921)
(holding cases decided under the Fourteenth Amendment inapposite to Fifth Amendment issue
since the "Fifth Amendment has no equal protection clause").
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THE CONSTITUTION AS REWRITTEN BY THE COURT

Although the text of the Constitution treating racial discrimination
has remained unchanged since the passage of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the effective Constitution-the body of law defined by
courts interpreting the Constitution-has undergone numerous changes.
It is now a dramatically different creature than it once was. During this
evolutionary process, the U.S. Supreme Court has effectively created four
different constitutions with respect to racial discrimination since the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. These constitutions have been
progressively more suspicious of using race to determine citizen rights as
they gradually require stricter scrutiny of both state or federal actions.
Each of these four constitutions narrowed the definition of legal racebased classifications and together they point toward ultimately adopting
a fifth constitution disallowing all race-based classifications as per se
illegal.

A.

The Court's First Constitution: Plessy v. Ferguson and
Not-So-Strict Scrutiny of State Racial Classifications

As noted above, the Supreme Court originally interpreted the Fifth
and the Fourteenth Amendments as operating independently of one
another because the more restrictive Fourteenth Amendment applied on
its face only to the states. 15 The federal government was thus free to
enact any racially discriminatory law so long as it did not deny due
process under the Fifth Amendment. States, on the other hand, were
barred from enforcing maliciously discriminatory laws. 16
However, despite the explicit mandate that states grant all citizens
equal protection, these restrictions on state freedom to discriminate were
surprisingly loose. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 17 the Court upheld a state
statute requiring "separate but equal" buses for blacks and whites. 18
The Court justified its holding by narrowly construing the Fourteenth
Amendment:
The object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce
the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature
of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based
upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality,
or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.

15.
16.
17.
18.

See Detroit Bank, 317 U.S. at 337.
/d.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
!d. at 548-49.
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Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation . . . do not
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have
been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency
of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power. 19

This
state
only
were

analysis explicitly upheld the use of color as a valid criterion for
law applications. Not only was race a valid factor, it could be the
factor as long as one could argue that the rights of different races
roughly equal.

B. The Court's Second Constitution: Brown v. Board of Education
and Bolling v. Sharpe Imposed Heightened Scrutiny on Malicious
Racial Classifications
1.

Malicious State Discrimination

Eventually, the Court broadened the definition of unconstitutional
malicious discrimination when it overruled Plessy in Brown v. Board of
Education 10 and declared segregated public schools to be inherently
unequal, and therefore unconstitutional. 21 A dramatically different
constitution-a second constitution-was thus created to govern racebased state laws. Race was no longer an acceptable factor unless the
state could satisfy strict scrutiny. To meet this test, states were required
to show a compelling interest furthered by the most narrowly tailored
means possible.
The Brown v. Board of Education decision took an important step
when it held that malicious discrimination violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. By finding that " [s]eparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal, " 22 Brown implied that
segregation was malicious discrimination and paved the way for the Court
to strike down numerous segregation laws. 23 Eventually the Court not
only held that "a State may not constitutionally require segregation of

19. /d. at 544.
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. !d. at 493.
22. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
23. See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54
(1958) (parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S.
879 (1955) (golf courses); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877
(1955) (beaches). Cf Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (municipal airport
facilities, restrooms, and restaurants).
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public facilities, " 24 but found other laws based strictly on racial classifications unconstitutional because they were malicious. 25
But the Brown holding only applied to the states and did not extend
to the federal government. The Court held that "by reason of the
segregation complained of, [the black plaintiffs were] deprived of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such
segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. " 26 Had the Court reached this second issue, it might have
limited the federal government indirectly by virtue of the parallel due
process clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. But it opted to
use a different case involving federal activity to test malicious discrimination under the Fifth Amendment.

2.

Malicious Federal Discrimination

Bolling v. Sharpe27 provided the Supreme Court with the opportunity to expand Brown to govern federal race-based actions. Interestingly,
Bolling was decided on the same day as Brown and relied heavily on
Brown's reasoning. 28 Because it arose out of a challenge to segregated
schools in the District of Columbia, which is part of the federal
government, the Fifth Amendment applied and the Fourteenth Amendment did not. 29 This posed a difficult question for the Court because
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment "is a more
explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law'
[required by the Fifth Amendment], and, therefore, [the Court did] not
imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. " 30
The Court answered this difficult question with surprising ease and
brevity, holding that federal race-based classifications were subject to the
same scrutiny that applied to state actions: "[l]t would be unthinkable
that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government. We hold that racial segregation in the public schools of the
District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. " 31

24. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963).
25. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (interracial marriages);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (interracial cohabitation).
26. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
27. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
28. /d. at 500.
29. /d. at 498.
30. /d. at 499.
31. /d. at 500.
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Although the Court does not explicitly state the minimum standards
that state and federal governments must satisfy for malicious discrimination to pass constitutional muster, the Court does say that racial
segregation in public schools fails to be "reasonably related to any proper
governmental objective, " 32 and that " [c]lassifications based solely upon
race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are . . .
constitutionally suspect. " 33 However, later cases explain that in order
to satisfy the Constitution, invidious discriminatory classifications must
pass the "most rigid scrutiny. " 34
D. The Court's Third Constitution: Strict Scrutiny of Benign State
Racial Classifications With Intermediate Scrutiny of Benign Federal
Racial Classifications under Richard v. Croson and Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC
Beginning in the 1970's, the Court faced a new discrimination
question:
whether benign discrimination (governmental programs
designed to benefit minorities) should be subject to the same strict
scrutiny as malicious discrimination. The Court struggled with this
highly controversial issue for more than a decade, rendering only
plurality opinions. 35 Then, in 1989 and 1990, the Court finally
provided majority holdings that established the level of scrutiny applicable
to benign discrimination. Thus, a third constitution was born.
1.

The Plurality Opinions

The first of the plurality cases was Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke. 36 In that case the Court upheld the use of race in
medical school admissions to a state university. Justice Powell, who
wrote the disposition of the case, called for "the most exacting judicial
examination" of benign discrimination. 37 But he stood alone in his vote
for such a high standard. Four dissenting justices voted for an intermediate standard requiring important governmental objectives substantially

32. !d.
33. !d. at 499.
34. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
35. See, e.g., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978);
Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S.
267 (1986).
36. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
37. !d. at 291 (Powell, J., plurality).
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related to those objectives. 38 The other four justices decided the case
exclusively on statutory grounds. 39
Two years later, in Fullilove v. Klutznik, 40 the Court upheld a
federal affirmative action program, though again without a majority
opm10n. Three justices voted to uphold the statute at issue under a
nondescript "most searching examination" test to determine constitutionality.41 Three justices opted for intermediate scrutiny; 42 three others
dissented, demanding strict scrutiny. 43
In 1986, the Court produced a third plurality opinion in l\)'gant v.
Jackson Board of Education44 when it struck down a school board's
policy of laying off non-minority teachers to extend an affirmative
preference to minority teachers. 45 Four justices argued for strict scrutiny. 46 Justice White concurred in the judgment and Justice Stevens
dissented, neither indicating the degree of scrutiny to apply. 47 Three
dissenting justices voted for intermediate scrutiny. 48 Still, the Court
remained without a final word on benign discrimination.

2.

Benign State Discrimination

Finally, in 1989, the Court produced its first clear majority decision
determining the test for benign governmental discrimination. City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 49 arose out of a city requirement that
general contractors under contract with the city award at least thirtypercent of the dollar amount of each contract to minority subcontractors.
For the first time, the Court had sufficient votes to create a majority
holding that established a single standard. Justice Scalia agreed with
Justice O'Connor (and the three members of the Court who joined her
opinion) that "strict scrutiny must be applied to all governmental
classifications by race, whether or not its asserted purpose is 'remedial'

38. !d. at 358-59 (Brennan, J ., dissenting, joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun,
JJ.).
39. !d. at 411-12, 421 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart and
Rehnquist, JJ .).
40. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
41. !d. at 491-92 (Burger, C.J., plurality, joined by White and Powell, JJ.).
42. !d. at 518-19 (Marshall, J., concurring, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.).
43. See id. at 523 (Stewart, J ., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.); id. at 537 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
44. 476 u.s. 267 (1986).
45. !d. at 273.
46. !d. at 273 (Powell, J., plurality, joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J.); id. at 285
(O'Connor, J ., concurring).
47. !d. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring); id. at 313-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. !d. at 301-02 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.).
49. 488 u.s. 469 (1989).
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or 'benign. "' 50 However, the holding was limited to state entities
because the case did not involve federal action and therefore did not
require the Court to construe the Fifth Amendment due process
limitations on the federal government.

3.

Benign Federal Discrimination

One year later, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 51 the Court
faced the question it avoided in Croson. In Metro Broadcasting the
justices treated a Fifth Amendment challenge to the Federal Communications Commission's race-based preferences for minority-controlled
broadcasting stations in awarding television and radio licenses. 52 This
time the majority distinguished its holding in Croson and held that benign
federal discrimination was subject only to intermediate scrutiny. Thus,
benign federal racial classifications were found "constitutionally
permissible to the extent that they serve important governmental
objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to
achievement of those objectives. " 53 The Court limited Croson's strict
scrutiny standard as applicable only to state entities, justifying the lower
federal standard by arguing that the Court owed greater deference to
Congress, a coequal branch of government that is not as susceptible to
"factional politics" as the states. 54
This series of benign discrimination cases created a third constitution
by applying two different analytical standards: strict scrutiny, which
applied to malicious state, malicious federal, and benign state discrimination; and intermediate scrutiny, which applied only to benign federal
discrimination.
III. THE COURT'S NEW CONSTITUTION: ADARAND'S STRICT
SCRUTINY OF BENIGN FEDERAL RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS

A.

The Court's New Holding

The Court's most recent affirmative action case revisits the holding
of Metro Broadcasting, overrules it, and introduces a fourth Constitution
to race-based scrutiny by sharply limiting benign federal discrimination.
In Marand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 55 the Court held that "all racial

50. !d. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 493 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ.).
51. 497 u.s. 547 (1990).
52. /d.at547.
53. ld. at 564-65.
54. !d. at 565-66.
55. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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classifications imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In
other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental
interests. " 56 For the first time the Court explicitly held that every kind
of discrimination-malicious state, malicious federal, benign state, and
benign federal-is not only immediately suspect, but must be sufficiently
compelling and narrowly tailored to withstand a most rigorous constitutional standard. 57

B.

The Majority's Survey of Prior Case Law

The majority relied on prior case law to support its affirmative
holding and to justify overruling otherwise binding precedent. In order
to impose its new, uniform strict scrutiny standard, the Court felt
compelled to overrule Metro Broadcasting which established the lower,
intermediate scrutiny as the applicable standard in cases involving federal
benign discrimination. 58
The majority revisited many of the prior race-based scrutiny cases to
extract "three general propositions with respect to governmental racial
classifications": 1) skepticism of any racial or ethnic criteria; 2)
consistency in drafting and applying the law to individuals without regard
to race; and 3) congruence between the Fourteenth Amendment
limitations on state actions and Fifth Amendment limitations on federal
actions. 59 These propositions "lead to the conclusion that any person,
of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor
subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that
person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny. " 60 This
conclusion, the majority argued, was unwritten but clearly established law
violated by Metro Broadcasting's aberrant holding. 61
The Adarand majority began its survey of racial classification
analysis by looking at Hirabayashi v. United States 62 and Korematsu v.
United States, 63 cases dealing with wartime restrictions on Japanese-

56.
57.
58.
59.
(1986)).
60.
61.
62.
63.

/d. at 2113.
/d. at 2112.
See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65.
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 267, 273
/d. at 2112.
/d. at 2113.
320 U.S. 81 (1943).
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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American citizens. 64 The Adarand majority emphasized that even in
these early cases, the Court observed that "[d]istinctions between citizens
solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality; ...
making racial discriminations . . . in most circumstances irrelevant and
therefore prohibited. " 65 This, said O'Connor in Adarand, planted the
seeds that matured in later cases as the tripartite propositions that
required Metro Broadcasting's rejection.
Having argued that strict scrutiny was established in its first racebased scrutiny cases, 66 the majority touts Bolling v. Sharpe61 as holding
that this strict standard applied equally to both state and federal actions. 68 The Bolling case, says the Adarand majority, emphasized the
congruent requirements of both state and federal governments. "[l]t
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser
duty on the Federal Government. " 69 "'[T]he Constitution of the United
States, in its present form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights are
concerned, discrimination by the General Government, or by the States,
against any citizen because of his race.' " 70 The Court then found that
"the resulting imposition on the Federal Government of an obligation
equivalent to that of the States, followed as a matter of course. " 71 By
interpreting these early cases in this way, the Adarand Court essentially
argued that even the earliest applicable precedents demanded skepticism,
consistency, and congruence.
The Adarand majority then argued that subsequent cases continued
to recognize the propositions indirectly. 72 McLaughlin v. Florida/3 for
example, invalidated race-based state legislation by relying on cases that
arose out of race-based federal laws. 74 This, notes the Adarand
majority, suggests that "the [McLaughlin] Court understood the standards

64. The Hirabayashi case considered a curfew imposed exclusively on persons of
Japanese ancestry. 320 U.S. at 83. The Korematsu case arose out of an order excluding
Japanese descendants from the "West Coast war area." 323 U.S. at 218.
65. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100.
66. The majority asserts that "the Court first faced a Fifth Amendment equal protection
challenge to a federal racial classification" in Hirabayashi. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2106.
67. 347 U.S. 498 (1954).
68. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2100.
69. /d. at 2111 (quoting Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500).
70. /d. at 2107 (quoting Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499 (quoting Gibson v. Mississippi, 162
U.S. 565, 591 (1896))) (emphasis added by Adarand majority).
71. /d.
72. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2107.
73. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
74. The Court quotes McLaughlin's citations to Bolling, Korematsu, and Hirabayashi.
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2107 (quoting McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 191-92).
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for federal and state racial classifications to be the same. " 75 O'Connor
then cites W!inburger v. Wiesenfeld' 6 as an explicit statement that equal
protection claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have
"always been precisely the same. " 77
The Court then tracks race-based scrutiny through a series of benign
discrimination cases78 that had been interpreted as establishing a lesser
standard for benign discrimination. 79 However, the Court rebuffs such
interpretation, claiming that the cases could not and did not undermine
the three established propositions demanding uniform strict scrutiny
because those cases produced only plurality opinions incapable of setting
binding precedent. The Marand Court stated that "[t]he Court's failure
to produce a majority opinion in Bakke, Fullilove, and "Jgant left
unresolved the proper analysis for remedial race-based governmental
action. " 80
The answer to the confusion over what rule controlled benign
discrimination came in part in Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 81 argued
the majority, when "the Court finally agreed that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all race-based action by state and
local governments. " 82 In other words, Croson simply made explicit
what prior cases since Hirabayashi had implied: race-based distinctions
must be viewed narrowly regardless of the alleged benign or malicious
impetus behind them. The Court then reasoned that Croson, as the first
Supreme Court case containing a true majority opinion, established the
first binding precedent dealing specifically with benign discrimination.
Having argued that prior cases established skepticism, consistency,
and congruence as the paramount principles underlying race-based
analysis, and having downplayed Bakke, Fullilove, and "Jgant as
decisions lacking binding precedent, the Court was prepared to challenge
the majority holding of Metro Broadcasting. Metro Broadcasting
distinguished between the powers of the federal government and those of
the states, holding that malicious discrimination was always subject to

75. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2107.
76. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
77. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2109. (quoting Weinburger, 420 U.S. at 638 n.2). The Court
also relies on Buckley v. Val eo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal protection analysis in the Fifth
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.") and United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166, n.16 (1987) (Brennan, J., plurality) (Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments are coextensive).
78. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2108.
79. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990).
80. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2109.
81. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
82. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2110.
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strict scrutiny, but that the federal government should be allowed greater
leeway when discriminating for benign purposes. 83 Consequently,
"'benign' federal racial classifications ... 'are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important governmental objectives within
the power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement of
those objectives. '" 84 In other words, Metro Broadcasting required
intermediate scrutiny.
The Court characterizes Metro Broadcasting as an aberration,
deviating from prior precedent in two ways. First, it "turned its back"
on Croson's explanation that activities are not readily classified as benign
or malicious and therefore must always be subjected to strict scrutiny:
"Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses
of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. " 85 Second, Metro
Broadcasting flatly violated the congruence proposition by applying
different standards of review to state and federal actions, 86 and consequently undermining skepticism of race-based classifications and
consistency of treatment without regard to race. "Metro Broadcasting
was thus a significant departure from much of what had come before
it. ,87
Such deviation required correction, according to the Court. "We
think that well-settled legal principles pointed toward a conclusion
different from that reached in Metro Broadcasting. We do not depart
from the fabric of the law; we restore it. " 88

B.

Questioning the Adarand Majority's Historical Survey of RaceBased Scrutiny

A close look at the Adarand majority's characterization of race-based
scrutiny raises serious questions. In Adarand the Court argued that early
cases established unwritten law that was consistently adhered to until
Metro Broadcasting unjustifiably deviated, and that the Court was merely
extrapolating the evolutionary trend expressed in cases up to Croson to
arrive at the holding in Adarand. However, Adarand does not simply
make explicit what was previously implied.

83. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65.
84. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65)
(emphasis added by the Adarand majority).
85. /d. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J., plurality)).
86. /d.
87. /d.
88. /d. at 2115.
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The first problem in the majority's analysis is the way it continually
refers to the text of previous decisions while virtually ignoring their
outcome. For example, the Adarand Court rests its premise on the
statements in Hirabayashi and Korematsu that racial classifications are
subject to the strictest scrutiny. 89 However, these cases actually upheld
the incarceration and curfews imposed on Japanese-Americans solely
because of their race, giving little more than lip service to the strict
scrutiny of which the Court had written. Thus, the outcome of the cases
suggests that the early Court adopted a far lower standard than the
Adarand Court contends. The Adarand Court's analysis is in serious
question because unless a true strict scrutiny standard was originally
established to analyze federal actions, the Court cannot honestly argue
that Metro Broadcasting deviated from the three'long-standing, consistently followed propositions of skepticism, consistency, and congruence.
The majority claims to be baffled by Korematsu's inexplicable
holding, implying that the Court actually established a meaningful strict
scrutiny standard based on the three propositions and then failed to follow
it. But after looking to the language of the cases, such surprise appears
to be unjustified or feigned. The Hirabayashi Court explicitly found that
"the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause and it restrains
only such discriminatory legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial
of due process, " 90 thereby showing that the Court was not committed to
the proposition of congruence. Then, in Plessy-like fashion, Hirabayashi
and Korematsu upheld the discriminatory classification under the highest
scrutiny, which was actually a weak intermediate scrutiny9 1 at best.
The Adarand Court's problem with emphasis on a textual holding
while ignoring the disposition of the cases continues when it discusses
Fullilove. The Court dismisses that case as non-binding authority simply
because it failed to produce a true majority opinion. 92 The Court thus
implies that a plurality opinion is little more than academic, persuasive
authority that may be easily ignored. By doing this, the Court carefully
crafts its analysis to relegate the disposition to little more than procedural

89. /d. at 2107.
90. 320 U.S. at 100.
91. "Intermediate scrutiny" falls between the elevated requirements of strict scrutiny and
the relaxed rational basis standard. Unlike strict scrutiny which requires a compelling state
interest furthered by narrowly tailored means, intermediate scrutiny requires only "important
governmental objectives" that are "substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 565 (1990).
92. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2109 (failure to produce a majority opinion left issue
unresolved).
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history, when in fact Fullilove approved a federal affirmative action
program that depended purely on racial minority ownership. 93
The most vexing problem with the Adarand majority's analysis is that
Metro Broadcasting specifically held 94 that benign federal discrimination
was subject to intermediate scrutiny. 95 In so doing, that Court rejected
the strict scrutiny established by Croson. 96
We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress-even if those measures are not "remedial" in the sense of being
designed to compensate victims of past governmental or societal
discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they
serve important governmental objectives within the power of Congress
and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives. 97

The Adarand Court could not explain away Metro Broadcasting as a mere
plurality decision as it had done with Fullilove. It had to recognize it as
clear precedent and stare decisis.
Justice Steven's dissent recognizes this difficulty: "As was true of
Metro Broadcasting," he writes, "the Court in Fullilove decided an
important, novel, and difficult question. " 98 Therefore, "[p]roviding a
different answer to a similar question today cannot fairly be characterized
as merely 'restoring' previously settled law. " 99 Aberration or not,
precedent must be followed under the doctrine of stare decisis. Allowing
a collection of holdings to imply a set of propositions that may trump a
clear holding is incongruent with the doctrine of stare decisis and leaves
that doctrine to future abuse.
In the end, the problems with the Adarand Court's analysis shows
that the Court cannot realistically argue that it simply took the principles
of the Constitution and made them explicit by correcting the aberrant
holding in Metro Broadcasting. The propositions that the Court relies on
were not established as clearly as the Court suggests, nor were they

93. The fact that the Bakke and Wygant dispositions struck down affirmative action
programs does not save the Adarand Court's treatment of Fullilove. The Bakke and Wygant
decisions were also plurality opinions that scrutinized affirmative action programs. However,
they dealt with state-run affirmative action programs rather than federal programs as in
Fullilove and Adarand. Since the Adarand Court was wrestling with whether scrutiny of
federal actions must be as strict as the scrutiny of state actions, the Bakke and Wygant
dispositions cannot support Adarand's holding. Thus, Fullilove remains problematic in
considering the Adarand majority's argument.
94. Metro Broadcasting was decided five to four.
95. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65.
96. /d. at 565-66.
97. /d. at 564-65 (emphasis added).
98. Adarand Construction, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2128 (1995).
99. /d.
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adhered to as consistently as the Court would have a reader believe.
Contrary to the Court's arguments, Adarand creates yet another
constitution.
IV.

THE FINAL CONSTITUTION APPLYING THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE

Indeed, Adarand does more than break from the past to establish a
new uniform standard of race-based scrutiny. It looks forward to a time
when a future Court will impose an even higher standard. In the
majority opinion, the two concurring opinions, and even in the dissents,
the members of the Court all anticipate "the time when race will become
a truly irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor." 100 The constitution
defined in Adarand is not the final constitution.

A.

The Majority Carefully Limited Its Holding

Justice O'Connor's majority opinion carefully and repeatedly stressed
that it adopted only a strict scrutiny standard rather than a more
restrictive per se rule against all racial classifications. 101 "Strict scrutiny," she writes in response to the dissent's objections, "does take
'relevant differences' into account-indeed, that is its fundamental
purpose[-]precisely to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of
race in governmental decisionmaking. " 102 Invariably, consistent treatment of different races is not required, says the Court, because even
though consistency as a principle forms much of the basis for the Court's
holding, a critical difference between consistency and strict scrutiny does
exist:
The principle of consistency simply means that whenever the government treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that person
has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit
of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. It says nothing
about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is
the job of the court applying strict scrutiny. 103

The majority distinguishes consistency from strict scrutiny in an
attempt to allay the dissent's fear that "strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory,
but fatal in fact.'" 104 A perfectly consistent rule would be a per se

100.
Klutznik,
101.
102.
103.
104.

See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (majority opinion) (quoting Fullilove v.
448 U.S. 448, 545 (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.
Id. at 2112.
Id.
Jd.
Jd. at 2114 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring)).
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rule. But the need for some race-based remedies to survive is justified,
says the Court, because of the "unfortunate reality" that "both the
practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority
groups" persists. 105
The Court cites United States v. Paradise 106 as evidence that where
there is "pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct" by
a government, a narrowly tailored race-based remedy can and will
survive strict scrutiny. 107 In Paradise, the Court recognized that the
Alabama Department of Public Safety had a history of continuous, blatant
discrimination against blacks. To correct this violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the district court ordered the State to hire one black trooper
for every new white trooper hired, until blacks comprised approximately
twenty-five percent of the state trooper force. 108 On appeal, the Court
in Paradise upheld the district court order because of the compelling
governmental interest in remedying past and present discrimination. 109
The Adarand majority ratified that conclusion in order to underscore its
commitment to a class of affirmative action programs, even if that class
is significantly restricted to programs which satisfy the "'narrow
tailoring' test this Court has set out in previous cases. " 110
B.

The Court Anticipates a per se Rule

Adarand suggests in its several opinions that the time will come when
minority preferences like those upheld in Paradise will not survive
constitutional analysis. The majority suggests this when it adopts the
language of Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Fullilove. Justice
Stevens had said that because benign racial discrimination "can only
exacerbate rather than reduce racial prejudice, it will delay the time when
race will become a truly irrelevant or at least insignificant factor." 111
By adopting Steven's forward-looking statement, the majority appears
to be doing more than simply using the tactical devise of using the words
of the most vocal dissenter against himself. 112 The statement meshes

105. Id.
106. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
107. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (citing Paradise, 480 U.S. at 167 (Brennan, J., plurality); id. at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
108. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 154-55.
109. /d. at 167.
110. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118.
111. ld. at 2114 (majority opinion) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448, 545
(Stevens, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
112. In Adarand, Justice Stevens wrote a dissent almost twice as long as the two
dissenting opinions by Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg combined. Consequently, the
majority attacks Justice Stevens' analysis throughout its own opinion.
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with the holding of Marand which takes another step in the gr~d~al
elimination of race as a legitimate consideration. Thus, the maJOrity
appears to advocate the ultimate adoption of a truly consistent rule, a rule
more frigid than the slightly permissive strict scrutiny it presently
embraces.
The concurring opinions argue more openly for a per se rule against
race-based classifications. Justice Scalia flatly asserts that "[i]n the eyes
of government, we are just one race here. It is American. " 113 As a
result, "government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction. . .. Under our Constitution there can be
no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. " 114 Under Justice
Scalia's reasoning, no affirmative action program would be constitutional.
He thus espouses a per se rule without specifically calling it so.
Justice Thomas argues as aggressively as Justice Scalia for adoption
of principles that would create in essence a per se rule against racial
classifications. "Government cannot make us equal," he says, "it can
only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." 115 But
in so doing, "under our Constitution, the government may not make
distinctions on the basis of race. " 116
Two of the three dissenting opinions also suggest a commitment to
a time when courts will not allow race-based classifications. Justice
Souter, with whom Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined, closed his
dissenting opinion by pointing out that some affirmative action programs
are justified now, in part because the time will come when they will no
longer be needed or allowed:
When the extirpation of lingering discriminatory effects is thought to
require a catch-up mechanism, like the racially preferential inducement
under the statutes considered here, the result may be that some members
of the historically favored race are hurt by that remedial mechanism,
however innocent they may be of any personal responsibility for any
discriminatory conduct. When this priCe is considered reasonable, it is
in part because it is a price to be paid only temporarily . . . Justice
Powell wrote . . . that the "temporary nature of this remedy ensures
that a race-conscious program will not last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate." 117

113. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring).
114. /d.
115. /d. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
116. /d.
117. /d. at 2134 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448, 513 (1995) (Souter, 1.,
dissenting)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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Since Justice Souter expects the price of affirmative action to be paid only
temporarily, it is evident that he anticipates a time when racial distinctions will be unconstitutional.
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg wrote "separately to underscore not
the differences the several opinions in this case display, but the considerable field of agreement" among the justices "that together speak for a
majority of the Court. " 118 One of the points she makes is that Adarand's holding is not intended to be the final chapter on race-based
classifications. "I see today's decision as one that allows our precedent
to evolve, still to be informed by and responsive to changing conditions." 119 Her own opinion and her concurrence with Justice Souter
show that she expects social evolution through "carefully designed
affirmative action program[s]" to eventually achieve de facto equal
protection of minorities. 120 This, in turn, will allow the Court to
eliminate minority preference entirely, and thereby remove race as a
permissible factor in governmental classifications.
V.

CONCLUSION

On occasion persons have referred to the Constitution as a "living
Constitution," 121 suggesting that as society changes, constitutional
interpretation must account for that development. Perhaps nowhere is the
life of the Constitution more apparent than in race-based scrutiny. This
area of law has evolved from being racist on its face, to subtly condoning
racism, to strictly denouncing it unless racial classifications are absolutely
necessary. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that this constitutional
evolution has not ended as the Court looks ahead to yet another
constitution in which racial distinctions will be per se unlawful.

David Zimmerman

118. /d. at 2134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
119. /d. at 2136.
120. See id. at 2134 (Souter, J., dissenting, with Ginsburg and Bryer, JJ.).
121. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlrneier, 484 U.S. 260, 290 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting): Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 26 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).

